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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of multinational enterprises (MNE) on civil conict. Al-
though this is a key determinant of underdevelopment, the role of multinationals in triggering
conicts has received surprisingly limited attention in the literature. I tackle this question by
merging geolocalized information on conict events with novel data on MNE aliates, and their
headquarters, for all African countries from 2007 onwards. MNE activity is found to have signi-
cant and heterogeneous eects on the probability of conict. In particular, activities that increase
local human capital (e.g. education and health) signicantly decrease conict probability, while
aliates in exploitative sectors (e.g. those intensive in scarce resources, such as forestry) have the
opposite eect. The increase in conict caused by the activities of multinationals in exploitative
sectors appears to be amplied where there are politically unrepresented ethnic groups. Berman
et al. (2017) analyse the impact of mining on conict. Among their results, they provide evidence
that in the mining sector a larger presence of foreign rms amplies the impact that mineral price
shocks have on conicts, while they nd no statistically signicant eect for domestic rms.1 My
empirical analysis expands this framework, focusing on all sectors of production, not only min-
ing, but nding the same dichotomy between national and foreign aliates of MNE.
The empirical analysis involves an original ad hoc dataset which combines two Bureau van
Dijk datasets, Historical Ownership Dataset and Orbis, on the worldwide location and activities
of both MNE aliates and their headquarters with the Armed Conflict Location Events Data
(ACLED) on the location and type of conict events and the actors involved. The units of anal-
ysis are cells of 0.5×0.5 degree latitude and longitude (approx. 55km × 55km at the equator)
covering the entire African continent. The use of georeferenced information, together with an
instrumental variables strategy, country×year xed eects, and cell xed-eects, permits causal
identication. The unique dataset on multinationals overcomes measurement and endogeneity
problems, and makes it possible to instrument MNE activities in a specic cell-year with several
measures of the headquarters worldwide performance over time.
The cases of Liberia and Mozambique help illustrate the magnitude of the phenomenon in-
vestigated. Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal in 1975, after centuries of resis-
tance, establishing the ideal of “la liberté de l’homme et de la terre” (freedom of man and land).
Yet in April 2011, in the Nacala Corridor, in the north, Mozambique signed an ambitious and
highly controversial trilateral cooperation programme, the ProSavana project, to promote “sus-
tainable and inclusive agricultural development” together with Japan and Brazil. The project in-
1The authors distinguish between rms from a foreign colonizer country and rms from a foreign country with
no colonial ties to the country where the mine is located.
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volved well-known multinational agribusiness and logging enterprises, including the Portuguese
Espirito Santo Group. The program targets 19 districts in three provinces, covering a total of 10.7
million hectares, of which 930,000 are cultivated annually by 692,000 rural families.2 Case stud-
ies have accused this project, like many others, of violating local people’s rights (e.g. expropriation
of villages, threats to food security, intensive use of water depriving people in the surrounding ar-
eas) with little if any compensation, and often producing conict situations.3 More in general,
there is a growing literature that points to the behaviour of private logging rms as a cause of
violence. For example, see the exhaustive analysis of the Liberian case by Global Witness in its
report Holding the Line (2017), which documents in detail all the links between local govern-
ment, multinationals and large logging contracts, with the emblematic case of the multinational
Samling Global.4 On the other hand, we observe also cases of multinationals creating positive
spillovers (Dhingra and Thenreyro, 2017), such as technology transfers, higher labour standards,
or investments in education, therefore raising the value of the outside option for the local popu-
lation with respect to criminal activities, thus decreasing the probability of conict. For a detailed
discussion, see the analysis of FDI spillovers in Sub-Saharan Africa proposed by the World Bank
(2012).
The rst part of this paper documents the correlations between MNE activities and conict.
A rst nding is that only some specic types of MNE aliate activity are correlated with the
probability of conict. This is demonstrated by exploiting variations in MNE presence over time
at the cell level. The second part of the paper argues for the causal nature of the correlations
found using an instrumental variable approach. Relying on the internal capital market litera-
ture, and exploiting the headquarter-aliate credit link (Boutin et al., 2013), I instrument MNE
activities at the local level using historical nancial data at headquarters level and credit avail-
ability. More specically, I interact pre-period headquarters dependence on external credit with
credit availability in the headquarters’ home countries, in order to obtain an exogenous variation
2The population of the target area was estimated at 4.3 million in 2011, most of them in rural areas and depend-
ing on agriculture for their subsistence. More specically, the average rural household in the region has 5 members,
so close to 3.5 million people in the area (more than 80% of total) live in the countryside and are engaged in agri-
culture. Note that small-holder farming is practised by 99% of all rural households in the region, the typical farm
averaging 1.34 hectares in size (MASA, 2015).
3Arslan et al. (2011); Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2011); Meinzen-Dick and Markelova (2009); Oakland
Institute (2013); Thaler (2013).
4On top of the NGOs like Global Witness, other actors and movements active in reporting these violations are
think tanks like the Oakland Institute, research projects like Environmental Justice (former EJOLT - Environmental
Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade), nanced by the European Commission and the European Research
Council, or research centres like the Environmental Science and Technology Institute of the Autonomous Univer-
sity of Barcelona (ICTA-UAB) or Business and Human Rights.
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of MNE activities over time. The intuition is straightforward: some aliates, in any given cell-
year, are part of a relatively healthy and robust multinational, not dependent on external credit,
while others haved weaker parent corporations. The latter are expected to be hit signicantly
harder by the 2008-2009 credit crisis, and therefore to reduce their activities substantially more
sharply. In the third part of the paper I provide evidence of a potential mechanism underlying the
results. Indeed, the impact of MNE activities in the exploitative sectors on the likelihood of con-
ict is shown to be amplied in areas characterized by the presence of powerless ethnic groups,
i.e. groups not represented in the local government. Using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR)
Core Dataset 2018, which gives information on the geo-localization of ethnic groups and their
access to power, one nds that MNE activities play an especially important role in the probabil-
ity of civil conict in areas where the leading ethnic group(s) can place the burden of land deals
on unrepresented groups.
This paper makes three main empirical contributions. First, this is the rst systematic study
of the impact of multinational enterprises on civil conict. Second, to my knowledge, it is the rst
paper that instruments MNE activities using the headquarter-aliate ownership link. Third, it
presents an original dataset mapping the worldwide population of MNE aliates and headquar-
ters in a panel framework. Moreover, it also provides a potentially generalizable rationalization
for the dierent eects in dierent sectors, with a clear link with the literature on ethnic conict.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the existing evidence and the conceptual
framework. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. In section 5 a
potential mechanism is examined. Section 6 concludes.
2 Existing evidence and conceptual framework
2.1 Evidence
In the last decade the literature has debated the complex link between trade and conict. Examin-
ing both international and domestic conicts, a rst cluster of papers use country-level aggregate
trade data (imports plus exports) as the measure of trade.5 However, global value chains now rep-
resent the main mechanism of international trade, in which multinationals are the main players.
5Two opposing views of international conict have characterized the debate: the “liberal” view, in which eco-
nomic ties are seen as opportunity costs of conict (Oneal and Russet, 1997, 1999, 2001), and the “realist view”,
according to which trade dependence implies future insecurity, increasing the incentive to avoid dependence by
force (Barbieri, 1996, 2002). Martin et al. (2008b) analyse the impact of international trade on conict probability
at country level, and then at the intra-state level, Martin et al. (2008a).
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Despite this predominant role, signicantly less attention has been paid to the relation between
foreign direct investment (FDI) and conict. Polachek et al. (2012) develop and empirically test
a two-country, one-period model, with homogeneous multinationals, showing that FDI can im-
prove international relations. This result is conrmed empirically by Bussmann (2010).6 Morelli
and Sonno (2017) show how country-level asymmetries in foreign value added,7 a proxy for global
value chains, can be relevant in conict analysis.
Recent works use disaggregated data to study the determinants of intra-state conicts. These
works seek to avoid country-level aggregation so as to overcome the attenuation bias implicit in
loss of within-country variations. Dube and Vargas (2013) exploit exogenous price shocks in in-
ternational commodity markets to assess how dierent income shocks aect conict, nding that
a sharp fall in coee prices lowers wages and increases violence more sharply in municipalities
where more coee is cultivated. On the other hand, a rise in oil prices increases both municipal
revenue and violence dierentially in the oil regions. Two works study the role of multinationals
in violence, one on conict and one on protest, but both on the mining sector alone. Berman
et al. (2017) analyse the impact of mining on conict. My own empirical analysis essentially ex-
pands their framework, in particular focusing on all industries, not only mining, and relying on
a dierent identication strategy. The authors use exogenous variations in world prices to docu-
ment a signicant and sizeable positive impact of mining on conict at the local level. Particularly
interesting for this work, among their results the authors also provide evidence that in the mining
sector a larger presence of foreign rms, dened as rms with headquarters not located in the for-
mer colonial power, amplies the impact that mineral price shocks have on conicts, while they
nd no statistically signicant eect for domestic rms. Moreover, they show that the higher the
share of foreign companies which are members of networks promoting Corporate Social Respon-
sibility in the mining industry, the lower the probability of conict. Christensen (2018) nds that
the probability of protest is twice as great in the case of foreign mining investment. The intuition
is that in a setting of asymmetrical information, when communities’ expectations exceed what
mining companies can pay, protests result.
To the best of my knowledge, the literature oers no systematic analysis studying the impact
of MNE activity, in all industries, on conict. This paper has the additional advantage of over-
coming one of the main limitations of the proximity-concentration trade-o literature8 by using
6FDI sales are used in these works as a proxy of MNE activities, owing to the lack of data on the actual location
of MNE aliates.
7Foreign value added indicates how much one country’s exports depends on other countries’ inputs.
8This strand of work focuses on the implications of the rm’s choice between FDI sales and arm’s-length trade
in deterministic models. See Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), Helpman et al. (2004).
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actual MNE aliate activity rather than FDI shares (used as a proxy in the past owing to the lack
of a database of physical presence of aliates).
2.2 Conceptual framework
A simple framework describing the individual decision to engage in conict can help formaliz-
ing the possible mechanisms at work. I adapt Becker (1968) to individual choices between em-
ployment in either a productive sector or a violent sector, depending on whether wages exceed
the return to violent activity. This framework can be applied to the civil war context if conict
is conceptualized as a tool for violently siphoning resources from the economy (civil war arises
from theft, as in Grossman, 1999). The utility in case of conict is equal to:
UC = pr − (1− p)c−m
where p is the probability of winning the conict; r is the appropriable rent; c is the absolute
value of the cost of losing the conict; m is the absolute value of the cost of conict. On the
other hand, the utility of working activity is equal to:
UW = αl l + αω ω
where l is the income from land;ω is the income from non-land activity (i.e. a proxy of education
and/or human capital);αl andαω are parameters in [0, 1] reecting how much the individual (i.e.
the relevant ethnic group) is represented in the government.9 Therefore, conict occurs if and
only if:
UC ≥ UW
Without losing generality, we can assume UC to be equal for all individuals in the same area,10
and hence can be controlled by cell xed eect. In Appendix A the framework presented above is
represented graphically, and simple comparative statics are described. The following hypotheses
arise:
Hypothesis 1: MNE activity in sectors that reduce land income (l) increases the probability
of conict; activities that increase the income from non-land-intensive activity (ω) decrease the
probability of conict.
9For example, in the case of land expropriation, you can think of αl as αl = 1− e+ k, where e is the fraction
expropriated by the government and k ≤ e is the government compensation. More generally, you can think of
informal taxes (τ ), e.g. αω = 1− τ .
10For example, p can indicate the pushback of the government, c the legal/physical strictness rebels are subjected
to by local authorities; m the cost of buying weapons to trigger conict; r the appropriable rent from the area and
from gaining power. Allowing r to depend on either (l, ω, αl, αω), leaves the results qualitatively unchanged. See
Appendix A.
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Hypothesis 2: The less individuals are politically represented in the government, αi with i =
{l, ω}, the higher the probability of conict.
3 Data
3.1 Data description
The dataset is structured as a full grid of Africa divided into sub-national units of 0.5×0.5 degrees
latitude and longitude. This level of aggregation is used instead of administrative boundaries in
order to ensure that the unit of observation itself is not endogenous to conict events.11
Conict data. I use the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (Raleigh et al., 2014),
whose main characteristic is information on geo-located conicts with and without fatalities for
all African countries. In other words, it records all political violence, whether part of a civil con-
ict or not, and with no threshold of battle-related deaths. The sample period is 2007-2015,
which overlaps with the available data on multinationals. The data comprise the latitude, lon-
gitude and the date of conict events, the actors involved, and their intensity, e.g. the number
of fatalities. Information is also provided on the precision of the geo-referencing of the events,
which is at least the municipality level in more than 96% of the cases and even ner (town or vil-
lage) for more than 80%. Following Berman et al. (2017) the only events considered are those that
are geolocalized with the ner precision level, and I drop duplicate events.12 ACLED uses several
sources, including press accounts from regional and local news, humanitarian agencies and re-
search publications. I aggregate the data by year. A dummy variable is constructed which equals
1 if at least one conict happened in the cell during the year. This represents the cell-specic con-
ict incidence. As in Berman et al. (2017) and previous works using the same methodology, this is
my main dependent variable throughout the paper. ACLED is not immune to potential bias and
measurement errors. For example, we cannot rule out the possibility that the reporting of con-
icts is biased towards certain countries, regions or type of events; in particular, some areas might
have better media coverage. However, the empirical methodology makes it unlikely that the re-
sults are aected, since structural dierences in media coverage or more generally in the reporting
of events are captured by cell and country-year (or, alternatively, region-year) xed eects.
Multinational enterprise data. To my knowledge this is the rst systematic study of the ac-
tual decisions of multinationals to locate aliates in foreign countries, covering all sectors and all
11See e.g. Berman et al. (2017), Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014), or Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016)
for papers using similar grid-cell level data and combined with the same conict data.
12This cleaning choice does not aect the dependent variable, which is conict incidence.
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countries of the world, in a panel setting. The main constraint of any analysis studying the trade-
o between exports and opening an in-country aliate has been the “dearth of internationally
comparable measures of the extent of FDI across both industries and countries” (Helpman et al.,
2004, pp. 306). In this paper I overcome this limitation using a novel algorithm. Two dierent
sorts of data are combined: worldwide ownership connections (provided by the Historical Own-
ership Database by Bureau Van Dijk) and rm-level nancial accounts (from Orbis by Bureau van
Dijk). The rst dataset provides daily information on ownership of all rms connected through
an ownership link, for the entire world, from 2007 onwards.13 The second dataset provides full -
nancial statement information, the industry (to 4 digits), and additional data such as the location
of the rm (latitude and longitude, or zip code). Having dened a multinational as a combination
of rms with autonomous legal status under some form of hierarchical control, I dene control
according to international standards for multinational corporations (OECD, 2005; UNCTAD,
2009b; Eurostat, 2007), i.e. a parent-company holding (directly or indirectly, i.e. via another sub-
sidiary) of the majority (50.01%) of voting rights of the aliate, making it the ultimate controlling
institution or benecial owner. This methodology allows the key distinction between domestic
and foreign aliates. Domestic aliates are dened as those located in the same country as their
headquarters; foreign aliates are located in a dierent country. I validate panel dataset obtained
for this paper with the cross-sections available in the literature (UNCTAD, 2011; Altomonte and
Rungi, 2013; Rungi et al., 2018; Altomonte et al., 2018). The correlations are on average above
97%. See Appendix B for a detailed description of the MNE data and its validation. I focus on the
subset of aliates located in Africa and their relative headquarters around the world. The nal
sample covers 52 countries and the MNE aliates operating in these countries, with information
on location and sector of activity. Knowing the geolocation of each aliate, I aggregate them at
the cell-year level. A limitation of the data is the poor coverage of aliates’ nancial information.
That is, I have full balance-sheet data for the headquarters, but for the aliates I cannot deduce
useful information - even, say, their size. I record only where and when they are active. Presence
thus serves as a proxy for MNE activity.14
Ethnic groups data. I use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Core Dataset 2018 (Vogt et al.,
13For example, it will report that, from a give date onward, rm A is owned (directly or indirectly, see details in
Appendix B) by rm B, for 60%.
14The low coverage of aliates’ balance sheet information might decrease the estimations’ precision. However,
the majority of MNE sectors which will be key in the analysis (i.e. forestry) will have an impact on conict through
their presence in a specic area. In other words, land-grabbing activity can be independent of the number of em-
ployees in the local aliate. Future research could integrate balance sheet information to verify whether the intensive
margin of aliates’ activity (e.g. size) has a role on determining conict likelihood, and also if this eect is heteroge-
neous depending on MNE sectors, as just discussed.
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2015). It contains information about all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state
power in every country of the world from 1946 to 2017. The data comprise politically relevant
ethnic groups for each country, their relative size as a share of the total population, and their access
to executive state power. Furthermore, I have geo-localized these data merging the EPR group-
year data with the spatial information contained in the GeoEPR 2018 dataset. Finally, using a
geographic model of intersection algorithms in Qgis, I have constructed a dataset cell-year-group
in which all main information about each ethnic group in one cell-year is contained.
Other data. For population data I use data from LandScan.15 This dataset has information
about the population living in 30-arc second cells (that is approximately 1 km2 near the equator).
Clearly, the dimension in km2 of these cells is not constant, as cell width varies with latitude of the
cell. The number of individuals is provided per cell. In particular, LandScan aims to “develop a
population distribution surface in totality, not just the locations of where people sleep”. For this
reason, it integrates diurnal movements and travel habits in one measure called ambient popula-
tion. To construct the data it uses a “smart interpolation” technique taking together information
from Census, primary geospatial input, ancillary datasets and high resolution imaginery analysis.
I have imported these data, for each year, in Qgis as rasters and computed population statistics
in each PRIO-GRID cell through an algorithm in Qgis. This algorithm is called Zonal statistics,
and it calculates some statistical values of certain rasters inside certain zones, dened as polygon
layers, in this case, PRIO-GRID cells. Finally, a number of cell-specic data are added, including
climate (rainfall and temperature), distance from the border, and whether the cell is in a capital
city.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show maps with averages over the
period. We observe over 10,000 cells in 9 years. A few elements are worth mentioning. First, the
unconditional probability of nding a conict in a given cell and a given year is low, around 10%.
In most cells no conict event occurs during the entire period. The probability of observing a
foreign MNE aliate is also very low, at 2%, and domestic MNE aliates are even rarer, at the cell-
year level of 1%. Second, aliates tend to be spatially clustered: conditional on observing at least
one aliate in a cell, the average number of aliates is 12.95 and 15.71, respectively, for foreign
15This product was made utilizing the LandScan (2006-2015)TM High Resolution global Population Data Set
copyrighted by UT-Battelle, LLC, operator of Oak Ridge National Laboratory under Contract No. DE-AC05-
00OR22725 with the United States Department of Energy. The United States Government has certain rights in
this Data Set.
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Figure 1: Conict events
Notes: The map shows the average number of conicts (ACLED) in each cell over the years
2007-2015.
Figure 2: MNE aliates
Notes: The map shows the average number of MNE aliates in each cell over the years 2007-
2015.
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and domestic. Finally, conict probability is much higher in cells with at least one MNE aliate,
around 51%.16 Of course, these descriptive statistics do not take into account key variables at
the cell-year level, such as population, something which is dealt with in detail in the empirical
analysis. Appendix C presents additional statistics for the conict and the MNE data. In the
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Median
Conict
Prob. conict> 0, all cells 92,995 0.10 0.30 0
Prob. conict> 0, if aliates = 0 90,501 0.09 0.28 0
Prob. conict> 0, if aliates> 0 2,494 0.51 0.50 1
# conict, all cells 92,995 0.66 9.02 0
# conict, if conict> 0 9,166 6.70 28.03 2
MNE
Prob. foreig aliate> 0, all cells 92,995 0.02 0.15 0
# foreign aliate> 0, all cells 92,995 0.28 4.81 0
# foreign aliate> 0, if aliate > 0 2,030 12.95 29.93 2
Prob. domestic aliate> 0, all cells 92,995 0.01 0.12 0
# domestic aliate> 0, all cells 92,995 0.21 5.45 0
# domestic aliate> 0, if aliate > 0 1,247 15.71 44.38 2
Notes: Author’s computation from ACLED and the MNE dataset elaborated for this work. There dataset is composed of 10,333 cells in a
panel from 2007 to 2015. Aliates with headquarter in their same country are dened domestics aliates, otherwise foreign aliates.
sample period the ACLED dataset records 61,626 conict events. Table A3 shows descriptive
statistics at the event-day level, and then aggregates the data at the cell-year level.17 As we can see,
more than 85% of cells where at least one conict was reported show at least one violent event. As
stated by the ACLED’s codebook itself, “a politically violent event is a single altercation where
often force is used by one or more groups for a political end, although some instances - including
protests and non-violent activity - are included in the dataset to capture the potential pre-cursors
or critical junctures of a conict”. Even if the preferred specication includes all events in order
to capture key developments leading to conicts, the sensitivity analysis shows that all results
are robust to dropping non-violent events and that there is no specic type of event driving the
results. Figure A5 shows annual aggregates of the number of MNE aliates and headquarters
in the African sample. The rate of growth of the number of aliates drops sharply owing to the
16And 53% for cells with at least one foreign MNE aliate (obs. 2494).
17Conditioning on observing a conict event (9,166 cell-year observations), the median number of conicts is
2, as shown in Table 1, while at the 25th and 75th percentiles the number of conicts events are respectively 5 and
23. Among all cell-years (92,995 observations), the percentage of cells with always peace is 69% (standard deviation
0.46), while that with always conict is 1% (standard deviation 0.10).
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crisis. Before 2009, the average rate of growth of African aliates was 19%,18 but it halves after
2009. The 31% jump in 2015, after years of growth below 10%, is subject to robustness checks,
to make sure that the overall results are not driven by this single sharp increase.
4 Impact of multinationals on conict
In this section the heterogeneous eects that MNE activity has on the probability of conict
are examined. The correlations between the variables are presented and an instrumental variable
approach is proposed to overcome endogeneity problems and to demonstrate causality.
4.1 Correlations




βs ×Affiliatessk,t + FEk + FEc,t + γXk,t + εk,t (1)
where (k, t, r) denote respectively cell, year, country (or region), s indicates the sector, FEk are
cell xed-eects, FEc,t is an additional battery of xed eects that can vary at dierent levels de-
pending on the specication (e.g. country×year, region×year),19 Xkt are time-varying controls
that always include the number of aliates of domestic headquarters. The dependent variable,
CONFLICTkt, is violent events at cell-year level, violence being measured in terms of incidence,
i.e. a binary variable coding events in the ACLED dataset as non-zero. The main explanatory vari-
ables, namely the vector of covariatesAffiliatesskt, are the number of foreign MNE aliates in
each sector in cell-year. Given the nature of the data, particularly its high spatial resolution, the
spatial correlation is important. As both conicts and aliates are clustered in space, standard
errors are estimated with a spatial HAC correction allowing for both cross-sectional spatial cor-
relation and location-specic serial correlation, applying the method developed by Colella et al.
(2019), who elaborating on Conley (1999) develop an estimator for the variance-covariance ma-
trix of OLS and 2SLS that allows for arbitrary dependence of the errors across observations in
space (or network) structure and across time periods.20 The rst column of Table 2 shows the
18Due to data limitations this statistic is computed only from 2007 onward, but other data sources (in ows, not
stocks) conrm this growth also before 2007 (UNCTAD, 2009a; UNCTAD, 2009b).
19Border cells are assigned to the country or region that represents the largest share of their territory.
20This empirical strategy imposes no constraint on the temporal decay for the Newey-West/Bartlett kernel that
weights serial correlation across time periods. The time horizon for vanishing of serial correlation is assumed innite
(100,000 years). A radius of 500km is set for the spatial kernel - close to the median internal distance in my sample of
African countries according to the CEPII geodist dataset, and following other works in the literature (Berman et al.,
2017).
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correlations between sectoral MNE activity (number of aliates) and conict probability in the
full sample.21 Exploiting the within-cell variation of aliates, we observe that: activity in the
Forestry and Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities sectors
is positively and signicantly correlated with conicts;22 while activities in Education, human
health and social work activities, Public administration and defence, and Other services are nega-
tively and signicantly correlated. In line with the literature (Berman et al., 2017), the presence
of aliates of corporations headquartered within the country do not have a positive signicant
eect on conict.23 For this reason, hereafter, the number of domestic aliates is controlled for
in all specications, and foreign aliates are simply called aliates. As the aim of this paper is to
precisely and causally identify the eect of MNE activities on conict probability, in the follow-
ing columns I exclude areas characterized by particularly high conict levels, independently from
multinationals. In particular, critique to this approach relates to the possibility of reverse causal-
ity in cells with aliates in the resource sectors (mining and quarrying, oil, gas, etc). Some recent
literature (Caselli et al., 2015; Berman et al., 2017) nds a causal link between the presence of
resources and violence. Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) nd evidence that conicts increase the
value of exploitative rms.24 For these reasons, column (2) restricts the sample to cells without
resources (gold, diamonds, oil, etc). Do Quoc et al. (2019), studying the links between capital
cities, conict, and the quality of governance, nd that conict is more likely to emerge (and
dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital. Moreover, De Haas and Poelhekke (2019), in estimat-
ing the impact of local mining activity on rm-level business constraints, exclude rms in capital
cities because limited scal redistribution may keep rents disproportional in the capital.25 For
21This specication uses mainly the High-level SNA/ISIC sector aggregation, but the results are robust to dif-
ferent aggregations, such as NACE Revision 2. See Appendix D for the replication of Table 2 with NACE Revision
2 aggregation.
22The latter include, for example, leasing of agricultural and forestry machinery.
23For readability, in Table 2 domestic aliates are grouped in a single indicator. However, as appendix E shows
in Table A5, if we replicate Table 2 by splitting domestic aliates by sector, and grouping in a single indicator foreign
aliates, no sector shows a positive correlation with conicts, while the domestic aliates in Education - Health re-
main with a negative and signicant sign. This is in line with the exploitative behaviour of foreign MNE described in
works such as Just Business (Ruggie, 2013): “Multinational corporations became the central focus of business and
human rights concerns because their scope and power expanded beyond the reach of eective public governance
systems, thereby creating permissive environments for wrongful acts by companies without adequate sanctions or
reparations.” Interestingly, in Table A5, the aggregate index Foreign affiliates is positive and signicant in any speci-
cation.
24They give several explanations: during conict, (i) entry barriers might be higher; (ii) the bargaining power
of governments might be lower and hence licensing cheaper; (iii) lower transparency leads to more unocial deals
which are protable to the rms; (iv) the manufacturing sector leaves the country, forcing it to specialize in natural
resources.
25Also the authors use, among others, a sample of mining rms from the Orbis dataset of Bureau van Dijk.
12
Table 2: MNE and conict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conict incidence
Agriculture 0.00581 0.0121 0.00391 0.0114 0.0117
(0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0140)
Forestry 0.163*** 0.179*** 0.157*** 0.155** 0.175**
(0.0558) (0.0666) (0.0579) (0.0701) (0.0689)
Fishing -0.0983 -0.128 -0.150 -0.194 -0.205
(0.112) (0.152) (0.118) (0.181) (0.175)
Mining and Quarrying 0.0143 0.0315 0.0129 0.0292 0.0270
(0.0139) (0.0245) (0.0159) (0.0242) (0.0238)
Other Resources -0.00569 -0.00255 0.0148 0.0193 0.0157
(0.0108) (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0184) (0.0189)
Manifacturing - Industries -0.00184 -0.00356 -0.00178 -0.00204 -0.00208
(0.00573) (0.00886) (0.00601) (0.00900) (0.00904)
Construction -0.00394 0.0226 -0.00110 0.0175 0.0109
(0.0141) (0.0166) (0.0142) (0.0164) (0.0169)
Wholesale - Accomodation -0.00164 -0.00726 0.00115 -0.00575 -0.00928
(0.00548) (0.00660) (0.00627) (0.00689) (0.00828)
Information - Communication 0.0129 0.0356* 0.0364* 0.0517** 0.0475
(0.0160) (0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0258) (0.0307)
Finance - Insurance 0.00353 0.00281 -0.00137 -0.00324 -0.0115
(0.00382) (0.00955) (0.00449) (0.00943) (0.00989)
Real estate -0.0105 -0.0164 -0.0174 -0.0141 -0.0127
(0.0211) (0.0266) (0.0219) (0.0266) (0.0279)
Support Service Activities 0.0162** 0.0293** 0.0188** 0.0271* 0.0282*
(0.00699) (0.0136) (0.00825) (0.0152) (0.0152)
Education - Health -0.0863** -0.108** -0.146*** -0.132*** -0.156***
(0.0340) (0.0473) (0.0438) (0.0489) (0.0544)
Public Administration - Defence -0.142 -0.141 -0.158** -0.157** -0.167**
(0.0883) (0.0920) (0.0778) (0.0780) (0.0823)
Other Services -0.0345** -0.0479** -0.0389** -0.0452** -0.0411*
(0.0154) (0.0188) (0.0169) (0.0201) (0.0231)
Domestic aliates 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Country× year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding resources Yes Yes Yes
Excluding capitals Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes
Observations 92,995 92,357 89,585 89,000 89,000
Notes: LPM estimation. Dependent variable: conict incidence (ACLED). ***,**,* = indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Conley
(1999) standard errors in parenthesis, allowing for spatial correlation within a 500km radius and for innite serial correlation. Each variable indicates
the number of MNE foreign aliates in its specic sector. Domestic affiliates indicates the number of aliates with a headquarter located in their same
country. In column (2) cells with natural resources are excluded. In column (3) cells in capital cities are excluded. Column (3) excludes both cells with
natural resources or in capital cities. Column (5) adds the lag of population ad the cell-level (LandScan) and cell-specic time trends.
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these reasons, column (3) excludes cells in capital cities. Column (4) excludes both resource areas
and capital cities, while column (5) adds the lag of population at the cell level and cell-specic
time trends.26 Considering the nal aim of this work, this last column represents our favourite
specication.
4.2 IV strategy
In the specications proposed above, but also more generally, assessing the impact of MNE ac-
tivities on violence poses a series of methodological diculties, chief among them being the po-
tential reverse causality from local violence to MNE activity. Excluding resource-intense areas,
the direction of this bias is most likely negative; that is, the existence of conict incidence might
decrease the likelihood of an aliate being active. However, we cannot completely rule out the
possibility that conicts may aect MNE aliate presence in a non-trivial way. Accordingly, in
order to demonstrate causality, I instrument multinational activities in each cell-year.
4.2.1 Methodology
Multinational activities can work their eects through several channels, both at the extensive mar-
gin (e.g. opening/closing of aliates) and at the intensive margin (e.g. number of employees).
The data available allows work only on number of aliates; the coverage of size variables, like
number of employees, is particularly poor. So we instrument multinational activities with only
one dimension of its realizations, i.e. number of aliates. The basic empirical strategy exploits
the fact that some aliates within a cell-year were part of relatively healthy and robust multina-
tionals, whereas others belonged to less healthy groups, which were aected more severely by the
crisis. More specically, pre-period data on the parent corporation’s exposure to external credit is
used, together with the amount of credit given in the headquarters country. I use this within-cell-
year variation to identify how the probability of conict changes with the (exogenous) change in
multinational activity. The idea is that when a shock hits the parent company, especially a credit
shock like that of 2008-2009, if some constraint on the amount of borrowing or any general
nancial help is imposed on aliates by the parent, this will have an impact on the aliates’ ac-
tivities. This thesis has found extensive support in the internal capital market literature (see, for
example, Boutin et al., 2013). Indeed, the years of credit shortage had a clear impact on multina-
tional activities in Africa. Figure 3 shows the aggregate number of aliates in Africa and its rate
26Clearly, population is a key determinant of conict. However, the lag of population could be considered a bad
control, but at the same time omitting it could cause an omitted variable bias. Results are robust including these
control variables or not; see the robustness Section 4.2.3.
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of increase. Note the sharp drop in the growth rate following the crisis, from 20% previously to
an average of 7% in the rst few years after 2009.27 In several countries, such as South Africa, the
number of aliates actually declined, as the second panel of Figure 3 shows.
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South Africa
Notes: The graphs show aggregate numbers of aliates by year, for all African countries and
focusing only on South Africa respectively. The histograms below show changes in number of
aliates.
27The dataset elaborated for this work only covers two years before the crisis due to data availability diculties.
However UNCTAD’s data on FDI ows conrm that before 2009 there was stable and rapid growth of FDI world-
wide and in Africa (UNCTAD, 2009a; UNCTAD, 2009b), and this growth diminished sharply with the 2008-2009
crisis.
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Notes: The graph shows the time coverage of the data used for the IV strategy.
Given the credit mechanism behind the 2008-2009 crisis, I follow Autor et al. (2013) in ex-
ploiting parent corporations’ heterogeneity in dependence on external nance in the decade be-
fore my analysis.28 I interact this with a year-c untry variable f r the level of credit the parent
company receives in its home country. The intuition is that the crisis hits parent rms dierently
depending on their reliance on credit. To avoid endogeneity I compute a headquarters-level mea-
sure of access to credit from the previous decade. Considering that the analysis is performed at
the cell-year level, I need one instrument (at least) for each sector, for each cell-year. The pro-
cedure follows three steps. First, I measure the “role” of each parent company in each cell in
the base year, 2007, considering the share of each parent m’s aliates in each sectors in the cell.
Specically, ws,mk,2007 represents the parent m’s share of aliates in cell k year 2007 in sector s.29
Second, I estimate the parent corporation’s dependence on external credit in the previous decade
(1997-2006),30 in the headquarters home country, o, denoted by Debtmo,97−06. Third, I then in-
teract this rm-specic (time-invariant) variable with measures of credit availability at the home
country-year level, Creo,t−1.31 Figure 4 is a visual representation of the IV approach. For each









where I keep as constant the initial share of multinationals, in each sector and in each cell, as
weighting strategy (ws,mk,2007) for exogeneity. This methodology presents the main limitation that
the instrument is not informative on where a headquarters might increase/decrease its activity,
28They instrument the exposure to import competition from China with the exposure to import competition
from developed countries in the previous decade.
29This is measured as the ratio between the number ofm’s aliates in sector s in cell k year 2007, or in it’s rst
year of activity in that sector-cell, and the total number of aliates in sector s in this cell-year.
30Measured as debt over equity, see Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Manova (2013).
31World Band data: (i) Domestic credit provided by nancial sector (% of GDP), (ii) Domestic credit to private
sector (% of GDP). The rst is used in the main specication, i.e. Creo,t−1, the second is an alternative measure of
credit in the robustness checks.
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while it is exogenously describing the level of multinational activities in cells where there was al-
ready a headquarters’ aliate at the beginning of the analysis. However, this might represent a
problem of power of the instrument. Indeed, this limitation does not allow to instrument all
sectors simultaneously, due to a problem of power. In Figure 5 I plot the IV sector-specic co-
ecients of 15 dierent regressions. Each dot represents the IV coecient of the corresponding
sector, controlling for all the other sectors (not instrumented). In other words, each regression
replicates column (5) of Table 2 instrumenting one single sector at the time. For example, the rst
dot represents the coecient of the instrumented variable (number of aliates in) Agriculture,
namely -0.0826 with a standard error of 0.0704, in a regression in which all the other (number of
aliates in the other) sectors are controlled for, but not instrumented. As it is possible to note, the
only two sectors which remain signicant are Forestry and Education, human health and social
work activities, with positive and negative signs respectively (0.126*** and -0.174**).32






















































































Coefficient (IV) Confidence Interval 10%
Notes: Each point represent the IV coecient for a specic sector in a LPM estimation which
follows the specication of column (5) of Table 2, in which the dependent variable is conict
incidence (ACLED) and all the other sectors (not instrumented) are controlled for, but not
showed in the graph. The brackets represent the 10% condence interval.
32Because the other sectors’ MNE aliates could be considered endogenous, in Appendix F I replicate Figure
5, without including the other sectors as controls. However, the specications in F suer omitted variables bias, so
the preferred specication is the one with the controls included. In particular, note that the only two sectors which
are signicant in both gures (so both controlling and not controlling for the other sectors) are the two mentioned
above, Forestry and Education - Health.
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4.2.2 Baseline results
Table 3 reports the baseline results. The estimation is the same as for equation 1, but here both
variables Forestry affiliates and Health - Education affiliates are instrumented at the cell-year level.
The dependent variable is the incidence of conict. We can see that in every column, the coef-
cients of interest are signicant at the 1% level. In particular, an increase in MNE activity in
the exploitative sectors increases conict probability, while in sectors that enhance local human
capital it decreases it. All specications include cell and country×year xed eects. The former
controls for time-invariant co-determinants of violence and MNE activity at cell level (a particu-
lar land conformation, say, distance to borders or to the capital, or ethnic cleavages). The latter
cleans country features that impact both on conicts and on MNE activity (e.g. property rights,
change of political representation). All specications also control for the number of foreign af-
liates in other sectors, and for the domestic multinationals’ number of aliates. Column (1) of
Table 3 replicates column (5) of Table 2 to facilitate comparison of the instrumented and non-
instrumented results. Column (2) presents the instrumented results. A few points are worth un-
derstanding. First, the IV approach conrms the downward bias of the linear probability model
(LPM), which underestimates the eect of MNE activity on violence, because of the lower prob-
ability of observing MNE activities in cells where there is violence. Second, the magnitude of the
eects is very substantial. The mean (and standard deviation) of the two explanatory variables in
cells with some MNE activity are 0.083 (0.335) for Forestry aliates and 0.093 (0.445) for Edu-
cation - Health aliates; and the probability of a conict in these cells is 0.53. Therefore, given
the results of Table 3, column (2), a 1-standard-deviation increase in MNE activity in the Forestry
sector increases conict probability by 14% of the mean. And a 1-standard-deviation increase in
MNE activity in Education - Health aliates decreases conict probability by more than 15% of
the mean.
4.2.3 Sensitivity analysis
The baseline estimates of Table 3 prove to be robust to a large battery of checks. Table 4 presents
these results.
Sample and dependent variable. First let us examine the robustness of the main result to
changes in the sample. Having only 2% of our observations with some MNE activity could be
seen as problematic. However, the fact that the sample does not consist only of cells with MNE
activity but also has a large number of cells without MNE, conveys information that is essential
to correctly estimating the eect we are interested in. In Table 4 we rst restrict the sample to cells
18
Table 3: Baseline results
(1) (2)
Estimator LPM IV
Dep. Var. Conict incidence
Forestry 0.175** 0.221***
(0.0689) (0.0804)
Education - Health -0.156*** -0.184**
(0.0544) (0.0722)
Country× year FE Yes Yes
Cell FE Yes Yes




Instrument for Forestry aliates 5.672***
(1.3849)
Instrument for Education - Health aliates 0.314
(0.2701)
Education - Health aliates
Instrument for Forestry aliates 0.835
(0.8455)
Instrument for Education - Health aliates 3.903***
(0.8455)
Notes: LPM estimation in column (1), IV estimation in columns (2). Dependent variable: conict incidence
(ACLED). ***,**,* = indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Controlling for: cell FE,
country×year FE, cell×year trends, other sectors aliates (dierent than Forestry and Education - Health), do-
mestic aliates (with a headquarter located in their same country). Excluding resources areas and capital cities.
Conley (1999) standard errors in parenthesis, allowing for spatial correlation within a 500km radius and for in-
nite serial correlation. Forestry affiliates indicates the number of foreign aliates operating in the Forestry sector
in the cell. Education - Health affiliates indicates the number of foreign aliates operating in the sector Edu-
cation and Human Health. The last two variables are instrumented, details are explained in Section 4.2.1. The
section First stages reports coecients of the rst stage estimations formalized in equation (2).
with some MNE activity during the period (row 1). Needless to say, this reduces the sample size
drastically. This exercise is particularly important to test the strength of the instrument. In fact,
in cells that have no aliates and do not add any during the period under analysis, the instrument
perfectly predicts the correct number of aliates – zero. So, restricting the sample to cells where
there is MNE activity in at least one year tests whether the instruments correctly predict MNE
activities in the two sectors. With this very demanding restriction, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistic is still high, above 19, indicating that the instrument is not weak even excluding all
cells with no aliates initially. Alternatively, in row 2, I implement a neighbour-pair xed eects
estimation, similar to Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Buonanno et al. (2015). Starting from the full
sample, I replicate the main specication in the subsample of mining cells and their immediate
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neighbouring cells without MNE aliates.33 I dene a neighbourhood xed eect that is specic
to each (MNE aliate + neighbours) group. The instrument of the MNE aliate in the cell is
also assigned to its neighbours. By contrast, the number of aliates can dier as it is set to zero in
neighbouring cells with no aliates. Identication hence relies on relative variations in conict
incidence in the aliate-cell with respect to its neighbouring cells when the instrument changes.
This exercise is similar in spirit to a matching estimator. Next, we exclude 2015 (row 3) as a
sort of outlier, given the sharp rise (26%) in number of aliates that year (see Figure A5). One
potential concern with the econometric specication proposed, and in particular with the use of
the country×year xed eects, is that some cells may belong to more than one country, which is
the case for almost 18% percent of the cells. In row 4 I exclude from the sample all border cells
for which the distance between the cell’s centroid and the closest international border is smaller
than 39 kilometers. In Appendix G the thesis is tested for an alternative dependent variable, e.g.
violent events only and events with some fatalities only. Finally I explore robustness to using
the alternative Uppsala Conict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UPCDP-GED),
which follows a dierent coding strategy.
Additional controls. Where agriculture is largely rain-fed, i.e. countries that lack extensive
irrigation systems and are not heavily industrialized, weather is crucial, and is also a key to con-
ict probability (Miguel et al., 2004; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012). For this reason, the results are
checked after controlling for (the log of) rainfall and (the log of) temperature (row 5). Further,
to control for possible indirect eects of the crisis on specic areas within a country (if the textile
industry, say, was particularly hard-hit, this might be expected to impact on specic African ar-
eas), I substitute country×year xed eects with region×year xed eects (row 6). In row 7 I add
the lagged and lead values of the dependent variable (conict incidence) at the cell level. In row
8 I exclude the lag of population and cell-specic time trends from the specication. In order to
proxy the level of development, or a disaggregated measure of GDP, I then control for nightlights
at the cell level (row 9).34
Dierent instruments. I also replicate the IV results using dierent instrumental variables.








33This estimation conrms also that the results are robust to the inclusion of capital cities and resources areas.
34Image and Data processing by NOAA’s National Geophysical Data Center, then aggregated at the cell-level.












where the rst is the same as in equation 2, while IFP is an Index of Financial Pressure (Nickell
and Nicolitsas, 1999) measured as
IFP =
Interest Payments
Profit Before Tax+Depreciation+ Interest Payments
Cre
′
o,t−1 is domestic credit (provided by nancial sector) as a % of GDP, andCreo,t−1 measures
domestic credit to private sector also as % of GDP. These two dierent credit aggregates serve to
reduce multicollinearity. The results are robust to this procedure. In addition, the use of two in-
struments allows us to perform the Hansen-J test, which yields a non-signicant p-value (0.332),
conrming the exogeneity of the instruments. The IV procedure is also applied using a dierent
measure of credit (row 11): in the IV strategy presented in equation 2, the variable Creo,t−1 is
replaced byCre′o,t−1 (described above). And the results also hold using a modied version of the
instrument, in which both the values of the independent variables of interest and the instruments
of the cells without aliates are replaced by the corresponding values of the closest cell with some
MNE activity, divided by the distance between the two cells (row 12).35 This methodology also
enables us to test once again the strength of the IV strategy again, not assigning zero to all cells
without aliates.
Test of the identication assumption. A potential concern is the instrument’s ability to
actually predict the probability of the parent company’s closing aliates in a given cell-year. For
this reason, to test the identication assumption we can regress the probability of each parent
(m), in each cell-year (k, t), closing at least one of its aliates (CloseAffmkt ) on the instrument,
controlling for cell xed eects (FEk), country×year FE (FEct), and other headquarters-specic





+ FEk + FEct + γXm + umkt (3)
Table 5 shows that an increase in credit in the home country does in fact decrease the probabil-
ity of closing aliates (column 1), and this result is robust to headquarters-sector xed eects
(column 2) and headquarters-location xed eects (column 3).36
35In cases where a cell with no aliates is equidistant from more than one cell with aliates, the average of the
variables of interest in these cells is taken.
36Specically, following the international ISO-3166 classications, the aggregate locations used as xed eects are:
Australia and New Zealand, Caribbean, Central America, Eastern Africa, Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe, Northern
Africa, Northern America, Northern Europe, South America, South-Eastern Asia, Southern Africa, Southern Asia,
Southern Europe, Western Africa, Western Asia, Western Europe.
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Table 4: IV - Sensitivity analysis
Forestry Education - Health
Coe Std. Err. Coe Std. Err. K-P F stat Obs.
Sample
(1) Only cells with some aliates 0.232*** (0.0711) -0.261*** (0.0823) 17.36 2,186
(2) Neighbor-pair xed eects 0.133** (0.0561) -0.235*** (0.0631) 11.62 35,986
(3) Excluding year 2015 0.187*** (0.0690) -0.187*** (0.0692) 29.91 79,112
(4) Excluding border cells 0.227*** (0.0826) -0.187** (0.0742) 14.70 73,178
Controls
(5) Precipitation and temperature 0.188*** (0.0681) -0.187*** (0.0678) 29.90 79,092
(6) Region×Year FE 0.194** (0.0893) -0.136** (0.0616) 13.14 89,000
(7) Conict (t-1) and (t+1) 0.217** (0.0960) -0.202*** (0.0781) 14.60 69,222
(8) Excluding lag population and cell-trends 0.230*** (0.0854) -0.146** (0.0719) 14.60 89,000
(9) Nightlights 0.185** (0.0723) -0.199*** (0.0650) 38.35 69,223
Estimation and IV
(10) Two instr.: Debt & IFP (H-J p-value=0.332) 0.166** (0.0693) -0.141* (0.0730) 23.76 89,000
(11) Di. measure of credit (to all from nance) 0.217*** (0.0731) -0.170** (0.0693) 12.65 89,000
(12) Intr. of closest cell with a. >0 / distance 0.237*** (0.0832) -0.239*** (0.0763) 18.17 89,000
Notes: The table reports IV estimation results from 11 dierent specications described in Section 4.2.3. Dependent variable: conict incidence (ACLED). ***,**,* = indicate signicance at the
1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Only coecients of the variables Exploitative affiliates are and Human capital affiliates reported. The rst indicates the number of foreign aliates operating
in an the Forestry sector in the cell. The second indicates the number of foreign aliates operating in the sectors Education - Health. K-P F stat stands for the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic.
Selection. Despite the IV approach, another potential problem with this methodology is
that the parent multinational may selectively decide, in crisis periods, to close specic aliates,
presumably those that are more costly or problematic (e.g. those in conict areas). Figure 6,
however, which compares the number of aliates in cells where conict was always absent with
that in cells with some conict (>0) during the period, shows that this does not happen to be
the case, as the trends in cells with and without conicts are parallel. A more formal test can
be performed by replicating equation 3 controlling for whether a conict event in the cell has
a signicant role per se in the corporation’s decision to close aliates, or whether such a role






+ γ Conflictk,t + ω Debt
m
o,97−06 × Creo,t−1 × Conflictk,t
+ FEk + γXm + umkt
As we can see from the last three columns of Table 5, the relevant coecients, namely γ and ω,
are never signicant.37 In other words, Figure 6 and Table 5 conrm that there are no signs of
37Note that they remain non-signicant even if the variable Conflictk,t is replaced by its lagged version
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selection in the parent company’s decision to close aliates.
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Year
Some conflicts Always peace
Notes: The graph shows the aggregate number of aliates by year, for all Africa, comparing cells
always in peace with cells in which at least one conict takes place during the period analysed.
5 Mechanism
The rst part of the paper tests the rst hypothesis presented in the theoretical framework. This
section studies the second hypothesis, concerning the role of political representation of ethnic
groups. We study the channels whereby ethnic political representation can be linked with conict
probability. Considering the key role of ethnic groups in developing countries,38 what happens to
the eects just described in areas characterized by the presence of politically excluded minorities,
i.e. ethnic groups without any representation in the national government? Unrepresented mi-
norities could increase conict probability owing to their exclusion from the benets generated
by MNE activities. Assume the government decides to redistribute the transfer received from
the multinational; if representatives of the local communities sit in the government, the relation
between the two agents (government and locals) will resemble a repeated game.39 In this case
Conflictk,t−1. Moreover, results remain unchanged if we substitute the headquarters’ aggregate location xed
eect (17 groups, listed in footnote 36) with a specic headquarter-country xed eect.
38See for example Walter (2006) on the importance of group concentration; Cederman and Girardin (2007),
Reynal-Querol (2002), Saideman et al. (2002) on the relevance of ethnic discrimination; and Morelli and Rohner
(2015) on the he importance of natural resource concentration and regional ethnic concentration for ethnic conict.
39In other words, the more locals are represented, the better informed the government is on their beliefs con-
cerning their land (e.g. the value of expected agricultural output), and no worries of unfullled promises will induce
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Table 5: The impact of conict on aliates’ closing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (6)
Estimator LPM
Dep. Var. HQ closing aliate
Debtmo,97−06 × Creo,t−1 -0.0627** -0.0772*** -0.0628** -0.0599*** -0.0717** -0.0602**
(0.0275) (0.0289) (0.0278) (0.0232) (0.0300) (0.0234)
Conflictk,t 0.00434 0.00571 0.00524
(0.00953) (0.0106) (0.00988)
Debtmo,97−06 × Creo,t−1 × Conflictk,t -0.00385 -0.00749 -0.00353
(0.0379) (0.0430) (0.0385)
Country×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter sector FE No Yes No No Yes No
Headquarter location FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 4,277 3,907 4,276 4,277 3,907 4,276
Notes: LPM estimation. Dependent variable: headquarter closing at least one aliate in cellk year t. ***,**,* = indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Standard er-
ror clustered at the headquarter level. Debtmo,97−06×Creo,t−1 indicates the instrument used in the main specication, at the headquarter level. It is computed as the interaction
between the headquarters level of dependence on external credit in the decade before the analysis (Bureau Van Djik), Debtmo,97−06, and an index of credit provided to rms in the
headquarters country (World Bank), Creo,t−1. Conflictk,t is a dummy variable taking value 1 when in cell k at year t at least a conict event is recorded in the ACLED dataset.
the government makes a compensation oer that is incentive-compatible, so we always observe
civil peace. Instead, when the local population is poorly represented, several channels could lead
to conict: for example, asymmetric information or commitment problems (Fearon, 1995). To
illustrate information problems, the government can be assumed not to know how strongly the
ethnic groups are attached to their land, and therefore how much compensation they need to be
given. Dierently from the previous case, here the government faces uncertainty, so conict takes
place with more than zero probability.40 Or this situation can be seen as a commitment problem.
In this multi-period framework, conict is not game-ending but establishes a temporary distribu-
tion of the transfer payment, which will be reviewed at the start of the next period. For example,
the government might oer the locals a certain transfer today and promise to increase the number
of jobs tomorrow. Locals can believe this promise or not, in any case increasing the probability
of conict to more than zero.
In the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Core Dataset (Vogt et al., 2015) for 2018, ethnic groups
the group to start a conict because their members in the government will ensure their fullment.
40Another example of asymmetric information can be a more behavioural explanation. Assume the locals do not
have information on the transfer the multinational gives to the government, because they are not represented. They
are only able to observe what they are oered, using this to estimate the original transfer to the government. If, after
accepting the oer, they learn the original value of the transfer, they may feel betrayed and start a conict. In real
life you can think of this signal as the locals seeing the machinery and the magnitude of the investments targeted on
what was their land.
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are included following a two-step process. First, a time-variant list of countries worldwide is de-
ned. Then, ethnic groups are coded.41 Data collection is performed with an online expert survey
under the label Expert Survey of Ethnic Groups (ESEG). Then each country coding is reviewed
and evaluated by the EPR Management Committee. I have constructed a dataset in which per
each cell-year, there is information about the ethnic group contained in that cell in that year.
To do so, I have used a geographic model of intersection algorithms.42 The nal database gives
information on each group in power in each country, with 7 classications (monopoly, dom-
inance, senior partner, junior partner, powerless, discrimination, self-exclusion).43 A group is
considered to be in power if it belongs to one of the rst four classes. To test the possible chan-
nels, assume that in each country c year t there are EthGroupsPowerckt ethnic groups in the
power coalition, and hence TotEthGroupsckt − EthGroupsPowerckt groups out of power.
Now consider that each country c is divided into cells, and that exploiting the foregoing data we
can determine, for each cell-year, which subsample of groupsEthGroupsPowerckt and groups
TotEthGroupsckt−EthGroupsPowerckt are present. Hence, the following index is computed





Considering that this channel could change signicantly depending on population of each ethnic
minority area, I also propose an analysis concerning the population of each ethnic group. In
particular, I use the variable containing information about each ethnic group as a fraction of
the country’s total population. The index of ethnic minorities that takes into consideration the
41In this sense, EPR denes ethnicity as “any subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on the belief
in common ancestry and shared culture”. However, these are included in the dataset only if politically relevant. In
other words, groups are included “if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if
its members are subject to state-led political discrimination”.
42This algorithm creates a dataset containing the geographical intersection of the other two. The GeoEPR dataset
provides information about ethnic groups as polygons in the space. Thus, the intersection algorithm creates, in this
case, the new dataset formed by the intersection of cells with these polygons. Through the use of a graphic modeller, I
have run one single model containing all year-specic intersection algorithm such that Qgis perform these algorithms
in succession automatically.
43Each ethnic group is assigned, according to the degree of access to central state power, to one of the seven cate-
gories. Monopoly: the group holds monopoly power in the executive and it is able to exclude all other ethnic groups.
Dominance: the group holds a dominant power in the executive but there is some limited inclusion of members
of other ethnicities who however do not have a real inuence on decision making. Senior Partner: representatives
of the group participate as senior partners in the executive and have a real inuence on political decisions. Junior
Partner: representatives participate as junior partners in government. Powerless: no political power in the executive
although without being explicitly discriminated. Discrimination: group members are subject to active, intentional
and targeted discrimination with the intent of excluding them from political power. Self-excluded: group members
control a particular territory and have declared it independent from central government.
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where TotPopckt is the sum of the population of all ethnic groups in a given cell k of a given
country j in a given year t; PopPowerckt is the sum of the population of all ethnic groups in
power in a given cell k of a given country c in a given year t. As a consequence, TotPopckt −
PopPowerckt is the total population of all ethnic groups in a given cell-year that are not in power.
Thus, this index is the proportion of the population of ethnic groups not in power over the total
in a given cell in a given year. EthnicMinoritiesckt has a mean of 33.85 and a standard deviation
of 43.30 in the full sample, and 12.32 and 26.53 respectively in the sample with some aliates.
On the other hand, EthnicMinoritiesPopckt has a mean of 31.58 and a standard deviation of
43.49 in the full sample, and 10.57 and 25.66 respectively in the sample with some aliates. The
hypothesis is that activity in exploitative sectors is more likely to induce conict in cells with a high
EthnicMinoritiesckt. Intuitively, in those cells land grabs are more likely to be to the detriment
of the powerless groups. Table 6 shows the estimations of the following IV specication:
CONFLICTk,t = σ Forestryk,t + τ EducationHealthk,t + θ EthnicMinoritiesk,t
+ η Forestryk,t × EthnicMinoritiesk,t
+ ρ EducationHealthk,t × EthnicMinoritiesk,t
+ FEk + FEc,t + ΓX
′
k,t + uk,t
where Forestryk,t and EducationHealthk,t are instrumented as in the baseline specication
(column 2, Table 3); EthnicMinoritiesk,t is the index described above in column (1), and re-
placed by EthnicMinoritiesPopk,t in column (2); the interaction terms are instrumented in-
teracting the instruments of Forestryk,t and EducationHealthk,t together with the index of
EthnicMinoritiesk,t in column (1) and withEthnicMinoritiesPopk,t in column (2); FEk
and FEc,t are cell and country×year xed eects; and X ′k,t contains the same controls as in the
baseline specication. In the rst column of Table 6 the IV results using theEthnicMinoritiesk,t
index are shown, while the second column uses EthnicMinoritiesPopk,t. Table 6 shows that
the coecient η is always positive and signicant while, interestingly, the coecientσ loses its sig-
nicance when we introduce the interaction with the ethnic minority share. This suggests that
the main channel through which MNEs in the Forestry sector increase conict is the presence
of politically unrepresented ethnic groups. In other words, this result shows that MNE activi-
ties play an especially important role in the probability of civil conict in areas where the leading
ethnic groups can place the burden of land deals on unrepresented groups. The magnitude of
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this eect is large: a 1-standard-deviation increase in the number of Forestry aliates in cells with
some affiliates (0.335), together with a 1-standard-deviation in the share of Ethnic Minorities in
cells with some affiliates (26.53) increases the probability of conict by 6 percentage points, or
more than 11% of the sample mean in these cells. The magnitude of the eect is very robust if
we consider the EthnicMinoritiesPopk,t, as in column (2). One could argue that this result
Table 6: MNE and Ethnic Minorities
(1) (2)
Estimator IV
Dep. Var. Conict incidence
Forestry 0.124 0.131
(0.0945) (0.0938)
Education - Health -0.197** -0.202**
(0.0937) (0.0933)
Ethnic Minority 0.000327** 0.000335**
(0.000157) (0.000142)
Forestry× Ethnic Minority 0.00596*** 0.00713***
(0.00152) (0.00191)
Education - Health× Ethnic Minority 0.00134 0.00140
(0.00125) (0.00126)
Country× year FE Yes Yes
Cell FE Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 9.352 12.41
Observations 69,348 68,962
Notes: IV estimation. Dependent variable: conict incidence (ACLED). ***,**,* = indicate signicance at
the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Controlling for: cell FE, country×year FE, cell×year trends, other
sectors aliates (dierent than Forestry and Education - Health), domestic aliates (with a headquarter lo-
cated in their same country). Excluding resources areas and capital cities. Conley (1999) standard errors
in parenthesis, allowing for spatial correlation within a 500km radius and for innite serial correlation.
Forestry affiliates indicates the number of foreign aliates operating in the Forestry sector in the cell. Ed-
ucation - Health affiliates indicates the number of foreign aliates operating in the sector Education and
Human Health. The last two variables are instrumented, details are explained in Section 4.2.1. Ethnic Mi-
nority indicates the share of politically unrepresented ethnic groups present in the cell-year in column (1),
computed as in equation (4), while in column (2) it is the is the proportion of the population of ethnic
groups non in power over the total in a given cell in a given year, computed as in equation (5).
is driven not by the share of excluded ethnic groups, but by ethnic fragmentation. In Appendix
H Table 6 is replicated, but substituting EthnicFragmentationk for EthnicMinoritiesk,t,
conrming that ethnic fragmentation is not driving the results.
Finally, studying the nature of conict provides additional anecdotal evidence to further cor-
roborate the mechanism described. ACLED codes three categories of violent events. First, bat-
tles, dened as “violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups (...) typically
within the context of a civil war”. Second, violence against civilians, “deliberate violent acts (...)
against unarmed non-combatants”. Third, riots, “demonstrations against a (typically) political
entity, such as a government institution, although they may also include demonstrations against
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businesses or other private institutions”. The channel described in the paper is characterised by
local violence, not escalating to the level of a civil war (thus, no battles), in which locals react and
ght to protect their lands (thus, no violence against civilians). Table A8 in Appendix I repli-
cates our baseline specications (Table 3, column 2) for each of the three categories of violent
events covered by the ACLED dataset. Interestingly, Table A8 conrms that the only type of
event which allows the detection of a signicant role of MNE activity, also unconditionally with
respect to other events, is riots.44 Despite the aim of this paper being to study the probability
of conict events in general, not the unconditional probability of specic types, this is an impor-
tant conrmation of the theory presented. Considering the events coded as riots are explicitly de-
ned as violent demonstrations against either political institutions or business, this strongly relates
with the possibility that locals react to either the ethnic groups in power (i.e. the government) or
against the multinationals directly.
6 Conclusion
This paper oers a systematic analysis of the activity of multinational enterprises on the likeli-
hood of civil conict in Africa, using novel and ne-grained panel data. I document a signicant
and quantitatively important impact of multinationals’ activity on the likelihood of conict, the
nature of the eect depending on the sector of activity. Exploitative sectors, i.e. forestry, increase
conict probability, while activity in local human-capital-enhancing sectors, such as education
and health, decreases it. A battery of sensitivity tests conrms that the results are robust to a va-
riety of alternative specications and additional controls. This disaggregated study of the causal
impact of multinational corporations’ activities on conict also illuminates a potential mecha-
nism through which these activities can lead to the escalation of violence. In particular, the in-
crease in the likelihood of conict is magnied in areas characterized by a high share of politically
unrepresented ethnic groups.
44Note that, as in Berman et al. (2017), the unconditional probability of observing specic types of events is
smaller than the probability of observing any type of event, as shown in column 2 of Table 3. In fact, Battle and Vio-
lence against civilians show the correct signs, but there is not enough power to detect their role unconditionally with
respect to other events. However, Riots show a positive and signicant role for Forestry and negative and signicant
for Education - Health.
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Appendix
A Conceptual framework - graphical representation
The simple framework presented in section 2.2 can be summarized graphically as in Figure A1.
On the vertical axis we plot the utilities, while on the horizontal axis we represent the unidimen-
sional index x = αl l + αω ω. Intuitively, UW is represented by a 45 degree lines, while UC
is a horizontal straight line with positive intercept.45 The intercept between UW and UC char-
acterises the cuto value of x, namely x̂, which represents the income that makes individuals
indierent between working and triggering conict. Individuals at the left of x̂ (characterized by
either low l, or low r, or low αi with i = {l, ω}, or any combination of them) prefer conict,
because for them UC > UW . The opposite applies for people on the right of x̂. Decreasing the
cost of triggering conict,m, and/or the potential cost of losing the conict, c, shifts theUC line
up, therefore increasing x̂. In other words, if the conict option is less costly, the cuto income
has to be higher in order to keep people indierent betweenUW andUC . The opposite happens
with an increase in p and/or in r.
Figure A1: Conict cuto and probability
Assuming that x ∼ f(x), from the right panel of Figure A1 we can see how these changes
shift the cuto x̂, thereby increasing the share of people preferring conict, namelyF (x̂). On the
other hand, any decrease in either l, ω, or αi with i = {l, ω}, will shift f(x) to the left, thereby
increasing conict likelihood, F (x̂); while any increase in either l, ω, or αi with i = {l, ω}, will
shift f(x) to the right, hence increasing the probability of peace, 1− F (x̂).
45Assuming pr ≥ (1 − p)c + m. If r depends on any of (l, ω, αl, αω), UC will have a positive slope. For
example, assuming r = x+ g, where g represents the gain in power in case of winning the conict, the two utilities
will always cross simply assuming that pg ≥ (1− p)c+m.
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B Multinational enterprise dataset
In this appendix I provide additional information on the MNE dataset, which geolocalizes the
worldwide population of aliates and headquarters, from 2007 onward.
One of the main challenges for the literature has been the absence of a global source of rm-
level data on the basis of which to document the activities of MNEs. In the past, the data used
has been mainly multinational corporation activity at the industry level or aggregate FDI ows
from balance-of-payments statistics as a proxy for foreign rm activity. The rst detailed charac-
terization of global, rm-level multinational activity is provided by Alfaro and Charlton (2009),
using data from Dun & Bradstreet. The authors elaborate a cross-section for the year 2005, cov-
ering 650,000 multinational subsidiaries in 400 industries and 90 countries. UNCTAD, with its
World Investment Report, compiles yearly a list of the biggest corporations operating worldwide.
In particular, UNCTAD (2011) also reports the number of parents and aliates involved in FDI
activities hosted by each country, for the year 2009.46 The rst dataset covering control chains
of corporate activities both domestically and abroad for all countries of the world is oered by
Altomonte and Rungi (2013).47 The authors map at the rm-level 1,519,588 aliates of 270,374
headquarters in 2010, across more than 200 countries and all industries. Rungi et al. (2018) pro-
pose an algorithm to derive the boundaries of business groups after simulating a voting rule in
the presence of interlocking assemblies of shareholders. The authors elaborate a cross-section for
the year 2015.48 In a recent work with coauthors (Altomonte et al., 2018), we use both data ob-
tained with the approach proposed in this paper and with that of Rungi et al. (2018). Moreover,
we compare the two approaches in detail, documenting that both produce similar results. Other
works focus on subsamples of countries or only large groups. For example, Belenzon et al. (2019)
elaborate a dataset of 53,944 groups in 15 West European countries,49 dropping those that hold
less than 10 million dollars in total assets, or have no more than two subsidiaries.
For this work, the ownership data are obtained from the Historical Ownership Database of
Bureau Van Djik, which provides, for each company, information on all shareholders. Starting
from these data, I elaborate an algorithm that retrieves the network of ownership for each busi-
46They use information from the Financial Times Ltd (fDi Markets).
47The correlations between the number of headquarters controlling foreign aliates abroad and the number of
foreign aliates located in each country, as retrieved from Altomonte and Rungi (2013) and matched against the
corresponding data from UNCTAD (2011) are 0.94 and 0.93. Potential dierences might arise from the fact that
the survey of UNCTAD (2011) refers to data in 2009, while Altomonte and Rungi (2013) cover 2010.
48A particularity of this approach is that it is able to capture particularly complicated cases of cross-holdings,
ownership cycles and consolidation of voting rights across fragmented networks of equity stakes.
49United Kindim, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium,
Netherlands, Switzerland, Portugal and Greece.
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ness group, relying on the denition of direct or indirect majority (> 50.01%) of voting rights
provided by Bureau Van Djik. This denition of control follows the international standards for
multinational corporations (OECD, 2005; UNCTAD, 2009b; Eurostat, 2007). I elaborate on
a routine prepared by Bureau Van Djik for the identication of a corporate ultimate owner and
then implement an algorithm based on the ownership links that provides the hierarchical struc-
ture accordingly, by climbing up the ownership structure. With this approach, I construct the
network of business groups for more than 200 countries, from 2007 to 2015, and then geolocate
them using zipcodes. To my knowledge, this is the rst global, rm-level dataset documenting
multinational activities in a panel setting. More details on this procedure can be found in the
Appendix of a subsequent more technical paper with coauthors, Altomonte et al. (2018), where
we use the approach proposed in this paper and explain the steps used to construct the networks
of groups more in details, in particular comparing it with other approaches in the literature.
I can validate my data with three dierent datasets. First, following Alfaro and Charlton
(2009), I compare my data with the data from UNCTAD (2011), for the year 2009. Figure
A2 shows on the x-axis the (log of) number of MNE headquarters in each country according
to UNCTAD (2011), and on the y-axis the corresponding number of MNE headquarters in that
specic country in my dataset. A perfect correlation would be visualized by a straight 45◦ line. In
this case the correlation between the two datasets is 0.90. On the right panel, instead, with the
same logic, I plot the number of foreign aliates. In this case he correlation is 0.95.50
Second, I can validate my dataset with the data for the year 2010 by Altomonte and Rungi
(2013). Following the logic described above, the correlation for the (log of) number of MNE
headquarters in each country is 0.97, while for the (log of) number of foreign aliates it is 0.99,
as shown in Figure A3.
Third, I validate the geographic coverage of the dataset proposed in this paper for the year
2015, Table A1, with the same table proposed by Rungi et al. (2018). “Parent companies - All”
is the number of parent companies by host economy; “Parent companies - Multinational” is the
number of multinational companies by host economy;51 “Subsidiaries - All” is the number of sub-
sidiaries located in a given host economy; “Subsidiaries - Foreign” is the number of foreign sub-
sidiaries located in a given host economy. The correlations between these four variables and the
50A possible source of dierences between these datasets is, in particular, the fact that UNCTAD (2011) refers
to data updated to 2009, while the data elaborated for this work started from a dataset updated to 2016, and Bureau
Van Djik has changed a signicant amount of information providers in recent years, also for very large countries
like the US and Canada. For a detailed description of the changes in data sources, please check the manual of the
Historical Ownership Database, where all the changes in covered are documented by year and by country.
51A multinational company is dened as a Global Ultimate Owner controlling at least one foreign subsidiary.
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ln(Number of foreign affiliates in the economy UNCTAD)
Notes: On the horizontal axis of the left panel we have the (log of the) number of MNE recorded in the UNCTAD (2011) dataset,
and on the vertial axis the same variable, but from the dataset elaborated for this paper. On the right panel, the horizontal axis is
again the (log of the) number of aliates in the UNCTAD (2011) dataset, and the vertical axis is the same variable elaborated for
this paper.
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ln(Number of foreign affiliates in the economy Altomonte-Rungi)
Notes: On the horizontal axis of the left panel we have the (log of the) number of MNE recorded in the Altomonte and Rungi
(2013) dataset, and on the vertial axis the same variable, but from the dataset elaborated for this paper. On the right panel, the
horizontal axis is again the (log of the) number of aliates in the Altomonte and Rungi (2013) dataset, while the vertical axis is the
same variable elaborated for this paper.
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corresponding table shown in Rungi et al. (2018) are (excluding the observations in the “Unas-
signed Country” category and taking into account also the breakdown by country, i.e. 21 data
points), 0.997, 0.998, 0.995, 0.990, respectively. For a more detailed comparison of this data with
Rungi et al. (2018), see the Appendix of Altomonte et al. (2018).
Table A1: Geographic coverage year 2015
Parent companies Subsidiaries
Host economy All % Multinational % All % Multinational %
Africa 6,592 0.27 4,52 2.09 42,242 0.82 26,209 2.43
Asia 1004,666 4.30 25,688 11.86 407,614 7.94 172,21 15.97
Australia 77,048 3.16 2,963 1.37 173,045 3.37 31,923 2.96
EU 629,104 28.42 119,362 55.11 1,865,582 36.36 561.503 52.06
Latin America 28,527 1.17 17,871 8.25 93,383 1.82 68,308 6.33
Other Europe 64,691 2.66 16,239 7.50 149,614 2.92 35.543 3.30
Rest of the World 48,81 2.00 7,031 3.25 102,729 2.00 28,607 2.65
Russia 45,01 1.85 1,029 0.48 141,493 2.76 54,071 5.01
USA 1,368,195 56.17 21,873 10.10 2,155,012 42.00 100,281 9.30
Unassigned country 149,902 - 149,769 - 26,366 - 25,871 -
Total 2,585,545 100.00 366,345 100.00 5,157,080 100.00 1,104,526 100.00
Notes: The table considers data of 2015. The regional aggregation follows the online version of the United Nations publication “Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use”.
In “Unassigned country” there are the observations for which we cannot assign a country, namely those with alpha-2 country ISO codes II, KV, YY and ZZ. The percentages are com-
puted excluding these countries.
More in general, the validation of Bureau van Dijk micro data has been documented by sev-
eral works. One of the latest is Fons-Rosen et al. (2013), revised in 2019, where the authors use
this data to create a dataset of foreign ownership and productivity which is representative for
both foreign and domestic rms. They focus on the manufacturing sectors of the eight advanced
European countries for which the OECD data is available (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden) for the years 1999-2012. Interestingly, the “aggregated foreign
investment”, obtained from the authors dataset by summing up the output produced by foreign
owned rms in their sample, tracks one-to-one the “ocial foreign investment” from the OECD,
as the authors show in Figure A4. Table A2 shows the distribution of MNE aliates by African
countries.
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Figure A4: Foreign Firms’ Share in Manufacturing Sales:






















Notes: The shares from the ORBIS data (blue dashed line with circles) are computed as the ratios
of the aggregated sales of firms in manufacturing with foreign ownership of at least 10 % to total
manufacturing sales across all ORBIS firms. Foreign multinational activity from the OECD data (red
solid line with diamonds) is the sum of sales of multinational manufacturing companies reported by
the AFA and AMNE databases of the OECD divided by total manufacturing sales in these countries
from the OECD STAN database. The figure represents average of countries for which the OECD
data is available: Finland, France, Italy, Norway, and Spain.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the data and
describes the construction of the variables. Section 3 discusses our empirical method-
ology. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Construction of Variables
Representative firm-level data, both for domestic firms and foreign firms, is important
for our analysis. The Orbis database by BvD is attractive for these purposes. BvD col-
lects data from various sources, in particular, national business registries, and harmo-
nizes the data into an internationally comparable format. The Orbis database covers
more than 200 countries and over 200 million firms (private and publicly listed), with
the longitudinal dimension and representativeness of the firms varying from country
to country depending on whether the smallest firms are required to file information
with business registries.
6
Source: Fons-Rosen et al. (2013), revised in 2019.
Notes: The shares from the ORBIS data (blue dashed line with circles) are computed as the
ratios of the aggregated sales of rms in manufacturing with foreign ownership of at least 10%
to total manufacturing sales across all ORBIS rms. Foreign multinational activity from the
OECD data (red solid line with diamonds) is the sum of sales of multinational manufacturing
companies reported by the AFA and AMNE databases of the OECD divided by total manufac-
turing sales in these countries from the OECD STAN database. The gure represents average
of countries for which the OECD data is available: Finland, France, Italy, Norway, and Spain.
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Table A2: Aliates country-year
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Algeria 137 181 234 275 297 298 286 294 321
Angola 65 73 98 114 113 125 136 166 175
Benin 13 14 17 17 19 21 20 22 26
Botswana 25 21 30 32 32 40 35 60 70
Burkina Faso 8 10 13 13 13 17 16 18 23
Burundi 1 2 4 6 6 6 6 7 7
Cameroon 46 46 54 54 52 49 57 65 68
Cape Verde Is. 16 19 22 22 25 24 26 32 33
Central African R 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Chad Republic 5 6 6 6 7 5 8 10 11
Comoros 0 1 2 1 1 2 4 4 4
Congo 13 13 14 19 22 23 29 28 38
DR Congo 10 10 13 20 13 17 20 24 32
Djibouti 1 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7
Egypt 74 89 98 105 119 138 149 145 173
Equatorial Guinea 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 8
Eritrea 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Ethiopia 2 2 1 3 6 7 9 15 19
Gabon R 10 15 19 22 29 31 32 31 37
Gambia 4 6 7 7 8 8 8 10 12
Ghana 7 8 8 10 13 12 13 13 15
Guinea 6 8 11 12 15 21 23 22 21
Guinea-Bissau 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 3
Ivory Coast 55 59 71 74 76 79 78 82 106
Kenya 12 18 15 14 15 15 22 25 30
Liberia 2 5 4 5 8 5 7 7 11
Libya 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 5 8
Madagascar 9 11 13 14 15 19 24 28 33
Malawi 5 4 6 5 5 4 5 4 6
Mali R 10 13 17 13 13 14 16 16 23
Mauritania 6 6 7 7 7 8 9 8 7
Mauritius 117 150 224 239 272 320 386 425 478
Morocco 401 502 605 683 734 754 867 932 1127
Mozambique 48 49 69 78 79 88 102 116 131
Namibia 38 42 60 58 63 70 71 77 95
Niger R 4 7 5 6 5 8 6 7 11
Nigeria 9 10 14 12 14 18 20 21 23
Principe 0 2 2 2 4 5 5 7 6
Rwanda 6 9 10 8 8 7 9 16 18
Senegal R 42 54 71 81 94 85 93 89 100
Seychelles 3 4 4 3 3 4 6 11 10
Sierra Leone 7 9 10 10 9 11 12 12 11
South Africa 1493 1700 1997 1829 1937 2126 2353 2466 3666
South Sudan 2 1 3 3 3 3 5 6 7
Sudan 12 12 17 20 21 23 27 24 29
Swaziland 28 32 40 42 42 46 55 53 56
Tanzania 25 28 31 34 31 32 45 58 69
Togo 6 7 11 14 15 13 20 16 24
Tunisia 11 11 12 11 10 10 11 12 13
Uganda 5 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 8
Zambia 62 68 91 98 99 111 130 126 160
Zimbabwe 18 23 23 28 31 39 39 39 66
Total 2886 3379 4104 4153 4428 4789 5329 5679 7440
Notes: The table presents the number of foreign aliates by country and year.
40
C Additional descriptive statistics
In this section we provide additional information on the conict and multinationals data. Table
A3 disaggregates the ACLED at the event-date level, and then at the cell-year level. On the other
hand, Figure A5 shows the evolution of African foreign aliates and their headquarters around
the world.
Table A3: Conict statistics




Violence against civilians 15,360 24.92
Remote violence 4,233 6.87
Headquarter or base establishment 165 0.27
Non-violent transfer of territory 457 0.74
Protest 13,891 22.54
Strategic development 3,663 5.94
Total 61,626 100
Cell-year level
Only violent 4,941 53.90
Violent and non-violent 2,921 31.87
Only non-violent 1,304 14.22
Total 9,166 100
Notes: In the rst panel (Event-date level), the unit of observation is a single event recorded
in the ACLED dataset. The rst four types of events are classied as violent. In the second
panel (Cell-year level), the unit of observation is a cell-year. The sample is limited to cell-year
showing at least one event recorded in the ACLED dataset.
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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
year
Foreign affiliates Headquarters
Notes: Author’s computation from the MNE dataset obtained from Orbis Historical
Ownership Database, Bureau Van Djik. The sample is limited to African aliates, with
their headquarters worldwide.
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D Dierent sectors aggregation
In Table A4 I replicate the correlations presented in Table 2, but applying the Nace sectors aggre-
gation. As we can see, the results are conrmed.
Table A4: MNE and conict - Nace aggregation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conict incidence
Agriculture 5.71e-07 0.00753 0.000587 0.00551 0.00784
(0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0156)
Forestry 0.169*** 0.172** 0.166*** 0.149** 0.169**
(0.0544) (0.0675) (0.0573) (0.0715) (0.0696)
Fishing -0.125 -0.137 -0.169 -0.200 -0.209
(0.114) (0.166) (0.119) (0.190) (0.183)
Mining and quarrying -0.00230 0.00587 0.0121 0.0198 0.0165
(0.00908) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0144)
Manufacturing -0.00316 -0.00485 -0.00331 -0.00376 -0.00153
(0.00589) (0.00874) (0.00624) (0.00913) (0.00944)
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.00896 0.00652 0.00561 0.0222 -0.0155
(0.0399) (0.0781) (0.0460) (0.0851) (0.0851)
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0.0570 0.0290 0.0537 0.0574 0.0391
(0.0478) (0.0615) (0.0502) (0.0740) (0.0834)
Construction -0.00229 0.0153 0.000377 0.0106 0.00409
(0.0138) (0.0168) (0.0151) (0.0167) (0.0170)
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.00490 -0.00156 0.00889 -0.000623 -0.00933
(0.00747) (0.00794) (0.00884) (0.00809) (0.00981)
Transportation and storage -0.00720 0.00481 -0.0130 0.00602 -0.00250
(0.0137) (0.0195) (0.0162) (0.0222) (0.0229)
Accommodation and food service activities -0.0152 -0.0130 -0.0155 -0.00803 0.00436
(0.0124) (0.0151) (0.0134) (0.0168) (0.0171)
Information and communication 0.0148 0.0315 0.0339 0.0477* 0.0410
(0.0158) (0.0193) (0.0207) (0.0261) (0.0328)
Financial and insurance activities 0.00191 -0.000716 -0.00315 -0.00610 -0.0133
(0.00420) (0.0101) (0.00489) (0.00985) (0.0104)
Real estate activities -0.0126 -0.0147 -0.0177 -0.0112 -0.00677
(0.0207) (0.0271) (0.0222) (0.0279) (0.0284)
Professional, scientic and technical activities -0.00524 -0.00289 0.00444 -0.00229 -0.00172
(0.0104) (0.0182) (0.0127) (0.0182) (0.0187)
Administrative and support service activities 0.0358*** 0.0656*** 0.0322** 0.0617** 0.0592**
(0.0124) (0.0182) (0.0140) (0.0246) (0.0235)
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security -0.170** -0.172** -0.183** -0.181* -0.212**
(0.0732) (0.0865) (0.0719) (0.0943) (0.105)
Education -0.108** -0.0955 -0.169*** -0.152*** -0.184***
(0.0525) (0.0591) (0.0561) (0.0535) (0.0649)
Human health and social work activities -0.0593* -0.111* -0.116** -0.111* -0.151*
(0.0346) (0.0630) (0.0463) (0.0652) (0.0770)
Arts, entertainment and recreation -0.0199 0.0231 -0.0114 0.0194 0.0332
(0.0429) (0.0319) (0.0390) (0.0354) (0.0345)
Other service activities 0.0228 0.0908** 0.0192 0.0735* 0.107***
(0.0513) (0.0443) (0.0685) (0.0395) (0.0247)
Activities of households as employers -0.0306* -0.0421* -0.0395* -0.0397* -0.0436*
(0.0173) (0.0219) (0.0210) (0.0213) (0.0251)
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies -0.0619 0 -0.0828 0 0
(0.0879) (0) (0.0962) (0) (0)
Domestic aliates 0.000518* 0.000366 0.000366 0.000259 0.000283
(0.000294) (0.000241) (0.000279) (0.000228) (0.000265)
Country× year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding resources Yes Yes Yes
Excluding capitals Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes
Observations 92,995 92,357 89,585 89,000 89,000
Notes: LPM estimation. Dependent variable: conict incidence (ACLED). ***,**,* = indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Conley (1999) standard errors in parenthesis, allowing for spatial correla-
tion within a 500km radius and for innite serial correlation. Each variable indicates the number of MNE foreign aliates in its specic sector. Domestic affiliates indicates the number of aliates with a headquarter
located in their same country. In column (2) cells with natural resources are excluded. In column (3) cells in capital cities are excluded. Column (3) excludes both cells with natural resources or in capital cities. Column
(5) adds the lag of population ad the cell-level (LandScan) and cell-specic time trends.
43
E Role of domestic aliates
Table A5 replicates Table 2, but focusing on domestic aliates, namely those aliates having the
headquarter in the same country where they are located.
Table A5: Domestic MNE and conict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimator LPM
Dependent variable Conict incidence
Agriculture 0.00376 0.0137 0.00687 0.0169 0.0125
(0.00772) (0.0161) (0.00861) (0.0158) (0.0170)
Forestry 0.00230 0.00677 -0.00107 0.0153 0.0190
(0.0310) (0.0352) (0.0286) (0.0336) (0.0370)
Fishing -0.0528 -0.0815* -0.0585 -0.0822* -0.0798
(0.0326) (0.0431) (0.0367) (0.0430) (0.0486)
Mining and Quarrying -0.0233 -0.0128 -0.0164 -0.00225 -0.00282
(0.0205) (0.0252) (0.0213) (0.0250) (0.0246)
Other Resources 0.0118 -0.00210 0.0128 -0.00321 -5.15e-05
(0.0126) (0.0214) (0.0156) (0.0208) (0.0220)
Manifacturing - Industries 0.00544 0.0119 0.00511 0.0113 0.0112
(0.00544) (0.00805) (0.00565) (0.00793) (0.00830)
Construction -0.000394 -0.0105 -0.00161 -0.0114 -0.00953
(0.00705) (0.0107) (0.00785) (0.0109) (0.0108)
Wholesale - Accomodation 0.00151 0.00242 0.00151 0.00241 0.00243
(0.00214) (0.00210) (0.00217) (0.00212) (0.00212)
Information - Communication 0.0104 0.0119 0.0104 0.0103 0.00934
(0.00890) (0.00896) (0.00927) (0.00889) (0.0116)
Finance - Insurance -0.00430 -0.00389 -0.00387 -0.00205 -0.00246
(0.00414) (0.00676) (0.00448) (0.00669) (0.00718)
Real estate -0.0131 -0.0376** -0.0179* -0.0400*** -0.0311*
(0.00871) (0.0154) (0.00994) (0.0154) (0.0184)
Support Service Activities -0.000182 -0.00333 0.00251 -0.00365 -0.00501
(0.00770) (0.0114) (0.00853) (0.0120) (0.0122)
Education - Health -0.0341*** -0.0403*** -0.0370*** -0.0383*** -0.0360***
(0.00858) (0.00688) (0.00889) (0.00640) (0.00815)
Public Administration - Defence -0.0181 -0.0442 -0.0261 -0.0421 -0.0380
(0.0318) (0.0350) (0.0344) (0.0342) (0.0348)
Other Services 0.00153 -0.000520 -0.00223 -0.00417 -0.00422
(0.00664) (0.00955) (0.00763) (0.00934) (0.00957)
Foreign aliates 0.00185** 0.00467*** 0.00255** 0.00468*** 0.00426**
(0.000941) (0.00172) (0.00119) (0.00174) (0.00209)
Country× year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding resources Yes Yes Yes
Excluding capitals Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes
Observations 93,003 92,364 89,592 89,007 89,007
Notes: LPM estimation. Dependent variable: conict incidence (ACLED). ***,**,* = indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Conley (1999)
standard errors in parenthesis, allowing for spatial correlation within a 500km radius and for innite serial correlation. Each variable indicates the number
of MNE foreign aliates in its specic sector. Domestic affiliates indicates the number of aliates with a headquarter located in their same country. In col-
umn (2) cells with natural resources are excluded. In column (3) cells in capital cities are excluded. Column (3) excludes both cells with natural resources or
in capital cities. Column (5) adds the lag of population ad the cell-level (LandScan) and cell-specic time trends.
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F IV without controls
In this section we replicate some of the main results without including (potential endogenous)
other sectors as covariates in the estimations. We replicate Figure 5 without controlling for the
other MNE sectors. In other words, Figure A6 plots the IV sector-specic coecients of 15 dif-
ferent regressions. Each dot represents the IV coecient of the corresponding sector, not con-
trolling for all the other sectors. Each regression replicates column (5) of Table 2 instrumenting
one single sector at the time. As it is possible to note, the only two sectors which remain signi-
cant in this gure and in Figure 5 are Forestry and Education - Health, with positive and negative
signs respectively (0.148* and -0.119*).























































































Coefficient (IV, no other MNE sectors) Confidence Intervals 10%
Notes: Each point represent the IV coecient for a specic sector in a LPM estimation which
follows the specication of column (5) of Table 2, in which the dependent variable is conict
incidence (ACLED) and all the other sectors are not controlled for. The brackets represent the
10% condence interval.
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G Sensitivity conict variable
In this section we present robustness of our dependent variable. Table A6 replicates our main
specication (Table 3, column 2) focusing rst only on violent events (according with the ACLED
denition), and then only on events with at least one fatality. Interestingly, as the results show,
the activity of Forestry aliates increases both the incidence of violent events and events with fa-
talities, as expected. On the other hand, the aliates in Education - Health sectors only reduce
violent events, while losing its signicance with respect to fatalities. The size of the coecients
in column (2) is smaller than the baseline results, reecting the fact that the unconditional prob-
ability of observing specic types of events is smaller than the probability of observing any type
of event. The latter being the primary focus of this paper, as shown in Table 3. We complement
the sensitivity analysis on violence measurement using an alternative conict database with geo-
coded information, the Uppsala Conict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP
GED) Version 19.1 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). It is more restrictive than ACLED, dening
incidents as “where armed force was used by an organized actor against another organized actor,
or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death at a specic location and a specic date”.
Moreover, such events are only recorded for conicts that reach at least 25 battle-related deaths,
according to the standard PRIO threshold.52 Due to these features, only the countries experienc-
ing more than 25 conict-related casualties are included in the UCDP GED sample. In our case,
this would imply a dramatic sample size reduction, almost a half.53 To alleviate this problem, I
combine the two datasets in columns (3) of Table A6. To be precise, I code violent events with
UCDP GED for country-year cells that are covered by this dataset, and for other country-year
cells, I use a dummy assuming value 1 when in the cell/year the ACLED dataset registers at least
one fatality. This procedure restores the initial sample size and conrms the results obtained in
column (2). Column (3) shows that the results on fatal conicts are conrmed jointly using the
UCDP GED and ACLED datasets, however it is important to underline that the type of events
described in this paper are characterised by localised conict events, and not escalating into larger
and more intense conicts (e.g. battles or civil wars), see Appendix I. Therefore, the only dataset
able to capture these events and currently available is that of ACLED.
52UCDP GED diers from ACLED also in it’s data collection process. UCDP GED events are coded following
two-steps. First, global newswire sources are consulted. Secondly, they are conrmed consulting local or specialized
sources, such as translations of local news performed by the BBC, local media, NGO reports, and eld reports.
53If we replicate the estimation on the sub-sample of country-years covered in UCDP GED, with a measure
of conict incidence based on UCDP GED events, the coecient of interest looses its statistical signicance. For
comparison, we replicate the estimation on the same sub-sample using the incidence of events with fatalities from
ACLED. We observe again a loss of signicance, conrming that it relates to the drastic sample size reduction.
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Table A6: Violence and fatalities
(1) (2) (3)
Estimator IV
Dep. Var. Conict incidence
ACLED UCDP-GED
Violent events Events with fatalities Events with fatalities
Forestry 0.247** 0.173** 0.208***
(0.0992) (0.0778) (0.0715)
Education - Health -0.259* -0.0903 -0.0441
(0.139) (0.103) (0.0925)
Country× year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 15.19 15.19 15.19
Observations 89,000 89,000 89,000
Notes: IV estimation. Dependent variable: violent conict event incidence from ACLED in column (1), event with some fatalities incidence from
ACLED in column (2), event with some fatalities incidence from UCDP-GED for the countries covered by this dataset and conict incidence with
fatalities from ACLED for the rest of the sample in column (3). ***,**,* = indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Controlling
for: cell FE, country×year FE, cell×year trends, other sectors aliates (dierent than Forestry and Education - Health), domestic aliates (with a
headquarter located in their same country). Excluding resources areas and capital cities. Conley (1999) standard errors in parenthesis, allowing for
spatial correlation within a 500km radius and for innite serial correlation. Forestry affiliates indicates the number of foreign aliates operating in
the Forestry sector in the cell. Education - Health affiliates indicates the number of foreign aliates operating in the sector Education and Human
Health. The last two variables are instrumented, details are explained in Section 4.2.1.
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H Ethnic groups fragmentation
In this section we analyse whether the result obtained in section 5 is driven by the ethnic group
fragmentation characterizing each cell, instead of the share of politically non-represented ethnic
groups. To test this hypothesis, we replicate the analysis presented in section 5, but substituting
the variable EthnicMinoritiesk,t with EthnicFragmentationk, a variable assuming value
one if the number of ethnic groups in a cell at the beginning of the period is above the 75th per-
centile of the distribution of ethnic groups in the sample.54 The sample distribution of ethnic
groups has mean = 1.55, s.d. = 0.77, 25th and 50th percentile = 1, 75th percentile = 2, 99th per-
centile = 4, min = 1, max = 6. Formally, we estimate the following equation:
CONFLICTk,t = σ Forestryk,t + τ Educationhealthk
+ η Forestryk,t × EthnicFragmentationk
+ φ EducationHealthk,t × EthnicFragmentationk
+ FEk + FEr,t + ΓX
′
k,t + uk,t
We do not include the EthnicFragmentationk alone because it would be absorbed by the
cell xed-eects (being evaluated at the beginning of the period to reduce endogeneity), while
we want to test whether the ethnic fragmentation has a role when interacted with the number
of Forestry aliates (η), and/or with the number of Education - Health aliates (φ). Table A7
conrms that both eects are not statistically signicant.
54Results are qualitatively the same if we use as more stringent threshold, e.g. the 99th percentile.
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Table A7: Ethnic groups fragmentation
Estimator IV
Dep. Var. Conict incidence
Forestry 0.267**
(0.133)
Education - Health -0.233**
(0.0994)
Forestry× Ethnic Fragmentation -0.0647
(0.163)
Education - Health× Ethnic Fragmentation 0.126
(0.159)
Country× year FE Yes
Cell FE Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 8.498
Observations 69,348
Notes: IV estimation. Dependent variable: conict incidence (ACLED). ***,**,* = indicate signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Controlling for: cell FE, country×year FE, cell×year trends, other
sectors aliates (dierent than Forestry and Education - Health), domestic aliates (with a headquarter
located in their same country). Excluding resources areas and capital cities. Conley (1999) standard er-
rors in parenthesis, allowing for spatial correlation within a 500km radius and for innite serial correla-
tion. Forestry affiliates indicates the number of foreign aliates operating in the Forestry sector in the
cell. Education - Health affiliates indicates the number of foreign aliates operating in the sector Educa-
tion and Human Health. The last two variables are instrumented, details are explained in Section 4.2.1.
Ethnic Fragmentation is a dummy variable assuming value one if the cell at the beginning of the period
has a number of ethnic groups above the 75th percentile of the sample mean.
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I MNE activity and nature of conict
Table A8 replicates column 2 of Table 3 for each violent category covered by the ACLED dataset:
battles between ghting groups, violence against civilians, and riots. The dummy Battle in col-
umn (1) equals 1 when a cell/year has experienced a battle of any kind, regardless of whether con-
trol of the contested location changes.55 In column, the dummy (2) Violence against civilians
captures instances where any armed group attacks unarmed civilians within a larger conict.56 In
column (3), the dependent variable Riots indicates instances of “violent demonstrations against a
(typically) political entity, such as a government institution, although this may also include some
demonstrations against businesses or other private institutions”. The fact that the unconditional
probability of observing specically Battles or Violence against civilians is not statistically signi-
cant does not mean that these events are not relevant in the probability of observing any type of
event, which is the main aim of this paper. On the other hand, it is particularly striking the fact
that the only unconditional probability which turns out to be signicant is the one of observing
Riots, independently of other types of events. This, indeed, can be considered as an anecdotal
evidence of the fact that the channels described in Sections 4 and 5 are the actual mechanisms
in place, in particular relying on the denition of Riots, which underlines violent actions against
political institutions (ethic groups sitting in the government) or business (MNEs).
55Formally, the ACLED denition of Battle is “a violent interaction between two politically organized armed
groups at a particular time and location. Typically these interactions occur between government militaries/militias
and rebel groups/factions within the context of a civil war.”
56From ACLED, “although the victims can be combatants in a dierent context, during acts of violence against
civilians, they are unarmed and not able to defend themselves or engage in violence”.
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Table A8: MNE and types of conict events
(1) (2) (3)
Estimator IV




Forestry 0.0375 0.286 0.194*
(0.101) (0.219) (0.117)
Education - Health -0.141 -0.00234 -0.328**
(0.0955) (0.112) (0.157)
Country× year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 15.19 15.19 15.19
Observations 89,000 89,000 89,000
Notes: IV estimation. Dependent variable: Battle incidence in column (1), Riots incidence in column (2), Vi-
olence against civilians incidence in column (3), all from ACLED. ***,**,* = indicate signicance at the 1, 5,
and 10% level, respectively. Controlling for: cell FE, country×year FE, cell×year trends, other sectors aliates
(dierent than Forestry and Education - Health), domestic aliates (with a headquarter located in their same
country). Excluding resources areas and capital cities. Conley (1999) standard errors in parenthesis, allowing
for spatial correlation within a 500km radius and for innite serial correlation. Forestry affiliates indicates the
number of foreign aliates operating in the Forestry sector in the cell. Education - Health affiliates indicates
the number of foreign aliates operating in the sector Education and Human Health. The last two variables
are instrumented, details are explained in Section 4.2.1.
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